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INTRODUCTION
After accepting our charge to address the title subject, Martin Rice and
I concluded that the differences  in our perspectives  would do more to meet the
goal  of this conference  than  would a  consensus piece.  While Martin  has ad-
dressed trade issues in a broader context,  I will confine  my comments  to struc-
tural changes  and their long-term implications  for the partners to the NAFTA.
The entire idea of NAFTA (and any other free trade agreement for that matter)
is  to integrate  markets  so that  resources  can  be  used most  efficiently,  costs
minimized  and,  consequently,  public  welfare  maximized  across  the  trading
countries.  This in no way implies that all consumers or producers will be better
off or that no consumer  or producer will be worse off.  The collective  welfare
(as measured  by  consumer  surplus)  will,  however, be  maximized  under  free
trade  and competitive markets.  Adjustment  times  and phase-in periods  allow
time  for those  made  worse off to make  adjustments  to  take advantage  of the
changes wrought by the  agreements.
The  NAFTA formalizes  a paraphrase  of communications  theory's ad-
monition that "You cannot choose to not communicate"...... the NAFTA brings
to hog and pork producers  in all three countries the message that "You cannotMeyer  207
Table  1:  Population and  Population Growth  Estimates,
NAFTA  Countries.
2000 Pop.  2025 Pop.  Natural  Growth  Time to Double
(Mil.)  (Mil.)  Rate (%/)  (yrs.)
United States  275.6  337.8  <1  120
Canada  30.8  36.0  -0  178
Mexico  98.8  132.0  1.95  36
Source:  Population  Reference Bureau,  2001
Table  2:  Pork Production,  Imports,  Exports and Consumption,
NAFTA Countries.
Production  Imports  Exports  Consumption
000  % of  000  000  000  % of
MT  Total  MT  MT  MT  Total
U.S.  8758  76.5  453  569  8440  80.1
Canada  1675  14.6  70  750  998  9.5
Mexico  1010  8.9  130  35  1105  10.5
Total  11443  10533
Source:  USDA  Foreign Agricultural Service
choose  to not compete."  The  emergence  of Japan as the  major export market
for all three countries would have eventually driven this point home. The NAFTA
has accelerated the process dramatically.  We can no longer view each country's
"market structure"  as a stand-alone  entity.  We  must redefine  structure  to en-
compass the entire trading community.
The key  to the NAFTA appeal  is what  each market offers  in terms  of
consumers.  Table  1 illustrates that NAFTA immediately increased the number
of buyers for goods from all three countries,  mainly due to the overwhelming
size of U.S. population and it's relatively  high personal income  level.  In fact,
the  $37 billion consumer expenditure on pork in the United States will eventu-
ally be completely open to trade from both Canada and Mexico.  Mexico offers
a long-term population growth rate that will not be matched by either the United
States or Canada.
At the  same  time,  the  number of sellers  chasing  consumers,  and the
amount of product offered to them, increased dramatically.  The dominant role
that the United  States  plays in  the overall  supply  and demand  picture  of the
North American  pork industry  is  illustrated in Table  2.  But economic  theory
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Figure  1:  Production  Cost  Distributions of U.S.  Hog  Producers,  Operating
and  Ownership  Costs.
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teaches us that it is the marginal unit of production that determines  price.  As a
result, each country will bear equal responsibility for the sector's performance.
While this is true, the United States appreciates  the importance of a small change
in its already-large  production  base.  We  have clearly been the major determi-
nant  of supply  and  demand  balance  but  growth  of Canadian  production  and
integration  of three  separate  markets will reduce this role over time.
Against this backdrop, I would like to address four aspects of industry
structure that are expected  to have  a bearing  on the  future of the North Ameri-
can  pork  industry,  and  discuss  how  they might  give  rise  to  various  types  of
trade tensions  and disputes.
Economies  Of Size  In Production
The  same  economies  of  size that have  driven  major changes  in pro-
ducer  structure  in the  United  States since the  1980s are now being realized in
Canada and Mexico.  The competitive  pressure  of generally  larger,  more effi-
cient units will drive the hog production sectors of all three countries over the
next 20 years.  The opening of markets  due to  NAFTA will speed up this pro-
cess.  USDA, Economics  Research  Service research  in 2000 showed dramaticMeyer  209
Table  3:  Operations and  Inventory  share with costs above  $50/cwt.
Costs above $50.
Category  Number  Inventory  Percent  Number  Inventory
Share  Share
Small  88,985  12  65  57,840  8.0
Medium  18,175  25  40  7,270  10.0
Large  4,765  22  10  477  2.2
Very Large  1,905  41  10  191  4.1
Total  113,830  100  65,778  24.3
Source:  McBride, William,  Production  Costs of U.S.  Pork Producers,
USDA-ERS  and Hogs & Pigs,  USDA-NASS,  December  1999.  In this study,
"Small"  producers  had  1-499  head  in  inventory, "Medium"  had 500-1999
head, "Large"  had 2000-4999  head, and  "Very Large"  had 5000 head  and
more.
differences  in  the cost  distributions  of U.S.  hog  producers  of  various  sizes.
Figure  1  shows the cumulative probability distribution functions from this study.
Note that nearly 80 percent of the large and very large producers had total costs
of $50/cwt or less.  Only about one-half of the medium-sized  and one-third of
the small producers  had such costs.  Herein lies the main force  for change  in
the U.S. industry over the past 20 years, and this force is now at work in Canada
and Mexico as well.
What does this  mean for the  structure  of the U.S.  industry?  Table  3
shows the  ERS cost distributions  and December  1999 data for  the number of
hog operations in the United States. The data show that about 58 percent of the
operations  in the United States,  representing  nearly one-fourth of the hogs in
inventory,  are  at competitive risk from more cost-efficient producers.
Economies  Of Size  In  Packing  and  Processing
Cost data for pork packers  are much harder to come by than data  for
hog production costs but consideration of the recent history of North American
packing companies  points out that significant economies  of size exist and that
these will drive change throughout the NAFTA countries.  The cost efficiency
of U.S. packers long made the United States the lowest-cost supplier of pork to
world markets.  Canada had an advantage  in hog production costs but was at a
decided disadvantage in packing costs due to U.S. packers economies  of scale
and  generally  lower  wage rates.  Much of that disadvantage  for  Canada has210  Structural Changes as a Source of Trade Disputes under NAFTA
disappeared.  The Maple Leaf Foods strike in  1997 lowered the wage structure
of Canadian  packing  plants.  Modernization,  expansion  and  construction  of
new plants has left Canada with several world-class packers which, when com-
bined with Canada's already  efficient  production segment,  can compete effec-
tively  in  any  market in the  world.  The same  pressures  will  likely now  affect
Mexico.  We already  see new plants aimed at export markets and we will likely
see more as Mexico's pork industry competes with the United States and Canada
at home, and in export markets.
Can packing economies-of-scale grow farther?  I'm always hesitant to
rule anything out but it is not clear that anyone will be able to push chain speeds
higher than what  we see now  in Brandon, Manitoba and Tarheel,  North Caro-
lina.  But there are a number of middle-tier packers that can capture some econo-
mies  by merging into multi-plant companies.  Heightened concern about food
safety and the food safety risk faced by single-plant firms will only enhance the
incentive  for  this  type  of consolidation.  The  competitive  bar will  rise  even
farther.
Barriers To  Entry
This  is a separate but closely related  topic  to the  discussion of econo-
mies of size.  As shown explicitly for production costs,  these economies  yield
substantial  advantages  to  large firms.  They  also necessitate very large capital
investment.  While modern hog production involves $4-$5 of capital per dollar
required  in modern  pork  packing,  the packing  sector  must  also invest  enor-
mous  amounts to establish brand identities  and build marketing relationships.
Brands are a key element in pork marketing  in North America.  A high propor-
tion of pork (60 percent or more) is processed and branded and, with the advent
of deep  basted "fresh"  products, this percentage is rising and will reach 80-90
percent  in  the  not-too-distant  future.  The  brands  themselves  are  viewed  by
many as barriers to entry.  Indeed, any new entrant  would be remiss if they did
not  recognize  the  value  of a  brand  name  and  the long,  difficult,  sometimes
expensive road that must be traveled to develop a successful brand.  But this is
not a function of corporate  manipulation;  it is a function of consumers'  valuing
consistency and dependability.  Here again, food safety  concerns have  added a
new aspect to the loyalty and trust relationship between a consumer and a brand.Meyer  211
Finally, the difficulty of breaking into established relationships can serve
as  a  large  barrier  to  entry.  This  is especially  true  in  international  dealings.
Retail chains and foodservice operations hold the key relationship, contact with
the consumer.  The  size, importance  and power of both retail and foodservice
firms has grown over  time.  Getting  access  to these  channels is no easy  task,
due largely  to their value  to incumbent  suppliers.
Product Differentiation
Product differentiation  has often been viewed  as a barrier to  entry, es-
pecially when incumbent firms are zealous about developing new product vari-
eties.  I'm not sure the  pork industry can be viewed  as "zealous"  in the same
way that, say, ready-to-eat  cereal manufacturers  were viewed in the 1970s and
1980s when this theory was developed.  This viewpoint  is raised only to offer
the  pork industry  as  its  antithesis.  Product  differentiation  is,  in fact,  the flip
side of market segmentation.  What good does it do to differentiate  a product if
there  is  not a  market segment  that wants  the "different"  product?  In  that re-
gard,  I think it is  obvious that new market segments  are developing  at  a rapid
pace  in all three NAFTA countries  and in their  export markets as  well.  Con-
sider China as a  1.2 billion consumer "segment"  that generally eats pork prod-
ucts that  U.S.  consumers  don't  eat!  That  may  be  less  true for  Canada  and
Mexico but  among  1.2 billion people  there  will be  segments  larger  than our
respective  countries!  In  addition,  these  emerging  segments  will  lend  them-
selves to service from smaller,  more nimble companies.  The large, "economies
of scale"  firms will  be able  to serve some  of these by  sorting from the wide
distribution of products, but many of these segments will be served by smaller
firms who can extract  enough value from their products  to overcome  scale dis-
advantages.
These  opportunities  should  exist  in  all three  NAFTA  countries,  and
abroad.  Market segmentation and product  differentiation  will be a wonderful
opportunity  in years to come.
Vertical  Integration
Vertical  integration is the Devil himself to many producers in all three
NAFTA countries!  Vertical integration is almost always synonymous with BIG.
The future, though, will require  some variant of vertical  integration regardless
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of size.  Value chains  are  composed  of innately  interdependent  agents.  Con-
sumer needs for consistency, convenience,  safety and specific traits like "green"
pork, Berkshire  pork,  "welfare"  pork,  etc.  will require  the  control of vertical
integration.  In fact, I believe we will see the smaller producer/packer segments
become  highly  vertically  integrated  long  before  we  see the larger  ones.  It's
already happening, helped along by more face-to-face  contact among the vari-
ous firms and the resulting easier  path to beneficial trust relationships.
Effect on Trade  Tensions and  Disputes
One conclusion that seems obvious from the first six years of the NAFTA
is that there will be more trade among North American countries.  Whether this
causes  more tensions  and disputes because  of more  opportunities,  or less  ten-
sions and disputes because of more familiarity  and comfort remains to be seen.
It appears to me that relations are getting better and that the parties involved are
learning how to effectively  settle disputes as they arise.  I believe, however, that
the competitive pressure of structural changes will cause considerable  dissatis-
faction  within certain  sub-sectors  of member  countries.  This  dissatisfaction
will  manifest  itself in political  responses  within the  NAFTA  countries.  My
experience  is that politicians can  usually best solve an internal political prob-
lem by finding someone  outside their borders to blame.  So, I think these  dis-
putes will,  in turn,  manifest themselves  in trade disputes.
The  hog price crisis  of late  1998  had nothing  to do with trade,  espe-
cially  within  North  American,  but NPPC  found itself arguing  with our own
producers  about  the effect  of Canadian  imports.  "Yes,"  we  said,  "live hogs
from Canada have worsened an already bad situation, but if you want free trade
it's a two-way  street and you can't bail  out when  it works against you!"  Most
reasonable producers accepted that position but I fear that the argument fell on
far too many  deaf ears belonging to producers who wanted  to create "Fortress
America"  in response  to  a severe  short-term  problem.  Furthermore,  most of
these producers  are the same ones who look for government  intervention in the
market-driven  changes  that have  occurred  in the U.S.  producer  segment over
the past decade.  When similar structural change occurs in Mexico and Canada,
I suspect that many producers in those countries will also want to blame NAFTA
trading partners.Meyer  213
The shift of the U.S. pork production segment to larger, generally more
efficient  units is  driving  changes in both Canada and Mexico.  My  friends in
these  countries  producer  organizations  are,  I'm sure,  already having  discus-
sions  about  the  wisdom of  subjecting  themselves  to  such  direct  competitive
pressure.  The aggressive  growth of production  in the Canadian prairie prov-
inces has many U.S. producers  posing the same question.
Remember my earlier paraphrase of communications theory: "you can-
not choose  to not compete"......  to which  I would add....  "short of exiting  the
business!"  Whether competing  in North America or Southeast Asia or Russia,
the pork industries of the United States, Canada and Mexico will compete  with
one another.  Some producers and processors in all three countries will be harmed
by the competition, but many will flourish.  Ultimately  though, our eyes must
be on our customers and it is they who will be the ultimate benefactors of more
competition  and more  cost-efficient  production and processing.